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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

--------------------- -------------- ---------------RUSSELL CAPSON and PEGGY
CAPSON, his wife,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
v.

CLIFFORD M. BRISBOIS and
SHIRLEY G. BRISBOIS, his
wife, and TRACY REALTY
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Defendants and
Appellant,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

--------------------------------------------------BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs adopt appellant's statement of the
nature of the case.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Plaintiffs adopt appellant's statement of the
disposition in the lower court.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek a ruling that the trial judge was
correct in denying an award of attorney's fees and costs
incurred by appellant in bringing the interpleader action.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs adopt appellant's statement of facts.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
POINT I
UNDER UTAH LAW, ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ARE
PROPERLY AWARDED ONLY WHEN AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE
OR BY EXPRESS TERMS OF A CONTRACT BETWEEN THE
PARTIES.
Utah law is clear that the court may award attorney's fees only when such an award is authorized by statute
or by express terms in a contract between the parties.
Walker v. Sandwick, 548 P.2d 1273, Utah 1976; Cluff v. Culmer,
556 P.2d 498, Utah 1976; Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168,
Utah 1977; Hawkins v. Perry, 126 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372
(1953); Holland v. Brown, 15 Utah 2d 422, 394 P.2d 77, 10
A.L.R. 3d 449 (1964).
Utah's rule regarding interpleader actions, Rule 22,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, makes no provisions for an
award of attorney's fees nor, in this action, is there any
agreement or contract between plaintiffs and Tracy Realty
Company, the interpleader and appellant, permitting such an
award.

Therefore, the ruling of the trial court denying

Tracy Realty Company attorney's fees was proper and should
not be disturbed.
Appellant points to the case of Maycock v.
Continental Life Ins. Co., 79 Utah 248, 9 P.2d 179 (1932),
in which the interpleader's request for attorney's fees was
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denied, as supporting its position that attorney's fees
should be awarded in the instant case.

The facts of the

Maycock case are remarkably similar to those here.

Maycock,

the plaintiff, claiming to be a beneficiary of an insurance
policy of the decedent, filed an action against Ogden State
Bank, the executor of the estate, and against Continental
Life Insurance Company, which issued the policy.

The insur-

ance company filed an answer (which is very similar to the
one filed by Tracy Realty in the instant case) alleging,
among other things, that it was without sufficient knowledge
to form a belief as to plaintiff's allegations and that it
was ready and willing to pay the proceeds to the proper
party but that it was unable to determine who the proper
party was.

No answer was filed by the bank, and a default

judgment was entered against it.

Similarly, in the instant

case, no answer was filed by defendant Brisboisies, and a
default judgment was entered against them.
The court in Maycock subsequently found that the
plaintiff was entitled to the insurance proceeds and denied
the insurance company's request for attorney's fees.

The

Utah Supreme Court upheld the lower court's denial of attorney's fees.

Among the court's criticisms of the insurance

company's actions was that the company, despite its stated
willingness to pay the proceeds to the proper party, had
also "assumed the role . . . of a defendant resisting plain-
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tiff's claim to the proceeds of the policy."

Tracy Realty

has assumed a similar role in that it resisted plaintiffs'
claim to the money because of defendant Shirley Brisbois'
instructions not to pay the money to plaintiffs.

If the

court now follows the reasoning of Maycock, the denial of
attorney's fees to Tracy Realty will likewise be upheld.
POINT II
THE COMMON FUND DOCTRINE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO
INTERPLEADER ACTIONS.
Appellant states that the "common fund doctrine"
is a recognized exception to the rule of no attorney's feu
unless authorized by statute or contract.

This doctrine

states that a court of equity may, in its discretion, properly award attorney's fees to one who, at his own expense,
has maintained a successful suit to preserve, protect, or
increase a common fund or has brought into court a fund
which others may share with him.

20 Am. Jur. 2d, Costs,

Sec. 83.
Plaintiffs do not challenge the correctness of
this ruling; however, it has no applicability to interpleader
actions.

An interpleader action involves a situation wherein

two or more parties are claiming a right to the same fund,
and the stakeholder, claiming no interest in the fund,
deposits the fund with the court, leaving all claimants to
litigate their claims so that it can be determined who is
entitled to the fund.

The interpleader is not preserving,

protecting, or increasing a common fund; rather, he is
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protecting himself from multiple claims or against liability
should he pay the funds to the wrong person.

An action

concerning a connnon fund involves a situation wherein a
party brings an action to actually preserve, create, or
increase a common fund.

"The rule rests upon the ground

that where one litigant has borne the burden and expense of
the litigation that has inured to the benefit of others as
well as to himself, those who have shared in the benefits
should contribute to the expense."

20 Am. Jur. 2d, Costs,

Sec. 83.
Appellant has cited no case in which attorney's
fees have been awarded to the interpleader-stakeholder based
on the theory of the common fund.
Buford v. Tobacco Growers Co-op Association, 42
F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1930), cited by appellant, was not an
interpleader action.

The Tobacco Growers Co-op Association

had brought an action asking that the court appoint receivers
on the ground of mismanagement and imminent insolvency of
the association.

As a result, receivers were appointed, and

a fund of $500,000 was realized.

Had the suit not been

instituted, the fund would not have been realized.
In Estate of Johnson, 27 Or. App. 461, 556 P.2d
969 (1976), also cited by appellant, the estate's personal
representative, who was one of three equal beneficiaries,
filed an accounting which failed to include a certain bank
account.

One of the other beneficiaries filed an action
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claiming that account should have been included, and the
court agreed.

The person bringing the suit was awarded his

attorney's fees because his action increased the value of
the estate by more than $11,000, and therefore, those who
benefited should share the cost.
Gold Dust Corporation v. Hoffenberg, 87 F. 2d 451
(2nd Cir. 1937), and Hsu Ying Liv. Tang, 87 Wash. 2d 796,
557 P.2d 342 (1976),

two other common fund doctrine cases

cited by appellant, were likewise not interpleader actions.
On page 7 of its brief, appellant states:

"A

majority of American jurisdictions including all federal
courts have interpreted their interpleader statutes to allow
attorney's fees and costs under the common fund doctrine."
However, not one of the interpleader cases cited on pages 8,
9, or 10 in support of that proposition even mentioned the
common fund doctrine.

In fact, most of those cases support

the proposition that an award of attorney's fees would not
be proper in the instant case.
The following cases, all cited by appellant,
illustrate the above:
Ferber Co. v. Ondrick, 310 F.2d 462 (1st Cir.
1962):

The lower court denied attorney's fees, and the

appellant court affirmed, stating that the lower court did
not abuse its discretion.

No mention was made of the

common fund doctrine.

. 6.
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A/S Krediit Pank v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 303 F.2d
648 (2nd Cir. 1962):

The interpleader was allowed costs and

attorney's fees because the plaintiff unjustifiably resisted
the interpleader action, but the case does not make it clear
whether attorney's fees were charged to the firm or to the
plaintiff/appellant.
Board of Education of Raleigh County v. Winding
Gulf Collieries, 152 F.2d 382 (4th Cir. 1946):

Attorney's

fees were awarded to the interpleader because a West Virginia
law, Chap. 107, Sec. 6, Code, specifically authorized the
court in interpleader actions to make orders regarding costs
and attorney's fees.
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Oliver, 412 F.2d 938 (5th Cir.
1969):

The court refused to award attorney's fees, stating

" ... the matter is ultimately vested within the sound discretion of the trial judge.

3 A. J. Moore, Federal Practice,

Paragraph 22.16, at 3144-45.

We find no abuse of discretion

here."
John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Beardslee,
216 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1954):

The insurance company inter-

pleader was not awarded attorney's fees.

One of the claim-

ant's to the fund received attorney's fees because the court
found the action filed against her was vexacious, and she
was awarded costs and fees pursuant to statute, Chap. 73,
Paragraph 767, Section 155, of the Illinois Revised Statutes .

. 7.
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Home Ins. Co. v. Burns, 474 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir.
1973):

The question of attorney's fees had not been deter-

mined by the district court.

The appellant court ordered

the district court to exercise its discretion and make a
determination as to whether attorney's fees should be awardei
Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wisconsin
v. Jarde, 73 N .M. 371, 388 P. 2d 382 (1963):

Attorney's fees

were awarded pursuant to statute, 59-10-23(D), N.M.S.A.,
1953 Comp.
Fisher v. Superior Oil Co., 390 P.2d 521 (Okla.
1964):

This was not an interpleader action.

Plaintiff had

requested attorney's fees out of a common fund.

The trial

court denied the request, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court
upheld the ruling, further found no common fund existed, and
emphasized "the rule that a court of equity may allow counsel
fees to an attorney who has created a fund does not apply
where there has been neither a creation, addition, nor
protection of a 'common fund'.

"

Greshem State Bank v. O.K. Construction Co., 370
P.2d 726 (Or. 1962):

Attorney's fees were awarded to the

interpleader but not out of the fund deposited in court;
instead, the court ordered that the losing party be charged.
"Where attorney's fees and costs and disbursements are
allowed, they must ultimately be borne by the losing party
brought into the interpleader proceedings."
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Appellant further states on page 10 of its brief
that although the interpleader statute of California does
not provide for an award of attorney's fees, the court, in
Fritschi v. Teed, 213 Cal. App. 2d 718, 29 Cal. Rptr. 114
(1963), nevertheless made such an award.

Attorney's fees

were indeed awarded but, contrary to appellant's conclusion,
pursuant to statute.

The court stated:

"The judgment under

appeal ordered that these sums [attorney's fees and costs]
be included in the costs payable by plaintiff Mrs. Fritschi.
Her counsel contends that 'there is no statutory basis that
award an attorney fee in a case of this nature. '

The

statutory basis for this award is Section 386.6 of the Code
of Civil Procedure."
As seen from the foregoing, the cases cited by
appellant offer no support for the position that the common
fund doctrine authorizes an award of attorney's fees to an
in terp leader.
POINT III
ALTHOUGH FEDERAL COURTS HAVE, IN SOME CASES,
AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE INTERPLEADER IN
INTERPLEADER ACTIONS, THE COURT HAS EMPHASIZED
THAT SUCH AN AWARD IS DISCRETIONARY.
Appellant relies heavily on the practice in federal
court of awarding attorney's fees in interpleader actions,
suggesting that, since federal rules and Utah rules regarding
interpleaders are similar, Utah should follow the federal
practice.

As pointed out in Point II, many of the cases
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cited by appellant do not actually support its position.

In

addition, and equally important, is the fact that the federa!
courts continually emphasize that an award of attorney's
fee is discretionary.
See Paul Revere Life Insurance Co. v. Riddle, 222
Fed. Supp. 867 (Tenn. 1963), wherein the court said:
The plaintiff had a right as a stakeholder,
acting in good faith, to maintain this action in
interpleader to avoid the vexation and expense of
resisting the adverse claims, even though its
officials believed only one of them was meritorious . . . ; but that right did not include a
further right to impress the fund with the expense
of interpleading it.
If the rule were otherwise, every stakeholder
confronted with two or more adverse claimants who
are claiming, or might claim, to be entitled to
money or property could interplead the fund,
depositing within the registry of the court, ga~
the protection afforded the stakeholder by an
adjudication, and, in effect, cause the successf~
claimant to bear the costs, counsel fees, and
expenses of the interpleading action.
For similar pronouncements, see First Nat. Bank
of Circle v. Garner, 567 ~.2d 40 (Mont. 1977); Stuyvesant
Insurance Co. v. Dean Construction Co., 254 Fed. Supp. 102
(N.Y. 1966), aff. 382 F.2d 991; American Smelt & Refin. Co.
v. Naviera Andes Peruana, S.A., 208 Fed. Supp. 164 (Calif.
1962), aff. 327 F.2d 581; Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Gustafson,
415 Fed. Supp. 615 (Ill. 1976).
The federal courts have also recognized that where
an interpleader action is brought in federal court and where
no federal interest is perceived, the court should look to
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state law to determine the attorney's fee question.

Equitable

Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Miller, 299
Fed. Supp. 1018 (Minn. 1964).

Therefore, had this action

been brought in federal court, the federal judge would have
looked to Utah law to determine whether attorney's fees
could be properly awarded.

The Utah court should do no

less.
POINT IV
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS IN THIS ACTION ARE COSTS
OF THE INTERPLEADER'S BUSINESS WHICH SHOULD NOT BE
BORNE BY THE PREVAILING CLAIMANT
It is common business practice and procedure for a
realty company to hold a deposit tendered by a prospective
buyer.

The standard earnest money agreement contains a

provision that if the buyer defaults the seller may retain
the deposit as liquidated damages.

Every time a default

occurs, a realty company faces the decision of whether to
deliver the deposit to the seller pursuant to the contract
or, if the buyer demands, to return the deposit to the
buyer.

That such a situation can and will arise is inherent

in the real estate business.

Such a risk is foreseeable and

should be regarded as a cost of doing business.

Such busi-

ness costs are not recoverable as attorney's fees.

In

Travelers Indemnity Company v. Israel, 354 F.2d 488 (2nd
Cir. 1965), the stakeholder insurance company brought an
interpleader action alleging it had been served with claims
.11.
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by several claimants to insurance proceeds.

The court

denied attorney's fees to the insurance company stating:
We are not impressed with the notion that
whenever a minor problem arises in the payment of
insurance policies, insurers may, as a matter of
course, transfer a part of their ordinary cost ~
doing business to their insureds by bringing an
action of interpleader. Denial of allowances [for
attorney's fees] in this case was by no means an
abuse discretion.
See also Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Gustafson, supra,
where the court stated:
Although it is true that an interpleader
action benefits both claimant and the court by
promoting the expeditious resolution of a controversy in one form, the chief beneficiary of an
interpleader action is the insurance company. An
inevitable and normal risk of the insurance business is the possibility of conflicting claims to
the proceeds of a policy. An interpleader action
relieves the company of this risk by eliminating
the potential harassment and expense of a multiplicity of claims and suits. Furthermore, it
discharges the company from all liability in
regard to the fund.
It thus seems unreasonable to
award an insurance company fees for bringing an
action which is primarily in its own self-interest.
If Tracy Realty is permitted an award of attorney's
fees out of the buyer's deposit in this case, it will have
been able to shift the cost of its business to one of the
claimants.
But more importantly, this cost would have been
shifted to the claimant whom the court determined to be
correct in its position.

If any party is to be charged with

Tracy Realty's attorney's fees, it should be the defaulting
buyer, not the sellers who prevailed.

See Greshem State
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Bank v. O.K. Construction Co., supra, and First Nat. Bank
of Circle v. Garner, supra.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's denial of attorney's fees should
be upheld for the following reasons:
1.

Utah law permits an award of attorney's

fees only when authorized by statute or contract between
the parties.
2.

The common fund doctrine permitting

attorney's fees has no applicability to interpleader
actions.
3.

An award of attorney's fees is within

the discretion of the trial judge, whose decision
should not be disturbed unless abusive discretion is
shown.
4.

Awarding attorney's fees to the inter-

pleader here would be enabling it to shift the cost of
business to one of the claimants.
5.

Making an award of attorney's fees out

of the fund deposited with the court charges the prevailing party with the interpleader's attorney's fees.
Dated this

B~

day of December, 1978 .
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